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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Brown on Keziah's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.
Addressing Keziah's final claim that Brown negligently supervised its
employees, the Fourth Circuit noted that to establish liability the plaintiff
must prove that the incompetent employee committed a tortious act resulting
in injury to plaintiff and that, prior to the act, the employer knew or had
reason to know of the incompetency. Keziah sought to prove the emotional
distress claim as the underlying tortious conduct for the negligent supervision
claim. Because the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against
Keziah on the emotional distress claim, the Fourth Circuit also affirmed
the district court's granting of summary judgment against Keziah on the
negligent supervision claim.
GovmuCMoNT BENEFTS
The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA), 45 U.S.C. sections 23lav (1982 & Supp. 1987), governs the retirement benefits for all employees of
United States railroads. The RRA requires employers to withhold employer
and payroll taxes, which fund railroad retirement benefit plans. In 1940,
Congress amended the RRA, adding the Foreign Service Exclusion which
provides that foreign nationals working for United States railroads outside
the United States cannot receive retirement credit in the United States if
the employees' country requires the employer to prefer its own citizens for
employment.
In 1978, the Canadian government enacted regulations changing the
Canadian Immigration Act, including the requirement that railroads operating in Canada prefer Canadian citizens for employment. The Internal
Revenue Service interpreted these regulations as triggering the Foreign
Service Exclusion of the RRA.15 4 The Railroad Retirement Board, which
administers the railroad retirement system, also concluded that the new
Canadian regulations fell within the Foreign Service Exclusion.' The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the Railroad
Retirement Board's view.1 6 As a result, Canadian employees of United
States railroads in Canada no longer received credit toward the RRA's
vesting requirements, and railroad employers no- longer owed retirement
taxes otherwise due on Canadian employees' services.

154. See Rev. Rul. 83-184, 1983-2 C.B. 173 (interpreting Canadian Immigration Act as
triggering Foreign Service Exclusion).
155. See General Counsel of Railroad Retirement Board Legal Opinion L-83-79 (March
25, 1983) (stating that Canadian regulations triggered Foreign Service Exclusion); General
Counsel Opinion L-83-79.1 (May 11, 1983) (same).
156. See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 842 F.2d
466 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming Railroad Retirement Board's conclusion that Canadian regulations triggered Foreign Service Exclusion); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. United States
R.R. Retirement Bd., 749 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same).
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In Vollmar v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 898 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1990),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the Foreign Service Exclusion precluded receipt of retirement benefits that a Memorandum of Understanding between railroad management
and labor otherwise granted to Canadian railroad employees. The plaintiffs
in Vollmar brought a class action against CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT),
a Virginia railroad company with operations in Canada. The plaintiffs
claimed that the 1973 Memorandum of Understanding (Memorandum) provided contractual rights to retirement benefits that CSXT contributed to
employee benefit plans. The Memorandum was the result of a collective
bargaining agreement designed to achieve a consensus on railroad retirement
legislation. The Memorandum shifted a portion of the retirement tax burden
from the employees to the employers, resulting in an increase in employee
take-home pay. In exchange, railroad employees agreed to take a wage
increase of only four percent.
The plaintiffs argued that because the contract agreement in the Memorandum was rendered impossible to perform, the plaintiffs were entitled
to restitution or, alternatively, to recovery in quaSi-contract. Additionally,
the plaintiffs argued that the refund of railroad retirement taxes that CSXT
had contributed to employee benefit plans unjustly enriched CSXT. Defendant. CSXT argued that retirement benefits for railroad employees are
statutory only. Therefore, the Memorandum did not create contractual
rights in the plaintiffs to receive benefits.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
705 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Va. 1989), agreed with the plaintiffs that the
Memorandum created enforceable contract rights in the plaintiffs. However,
the district court found that the parties reasonably could have foreseen the
applicability of the Foreign Service Exclusion, which made the contract
impossible to perform. The district court, therefore, denied recovery for the
plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs should have anticipated changes in
Canadian law which would trigger the Foreign Service Exclusion. The lower
court also rejected plaintiffs' unjust enrichment theory because it found
that express contract rights existed.
The plaintiffs appealed the district court decision, arguing that the
Memorandum entitled them to receive, in cash, the amount of retirement
taxes originally contributed by CSXT and later refunded to CSXT, in
addition to the taxes that CSXT would have paid absent the Foreign Service
Exclusion. The Fourth Circuit relied on Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
572 (1979), to hold that railroad retirement benefits, unlike most private
pension plans, are entirely statutory rather than contractual. The court
concluded that because the railroad retirement plan is a federally funded
and administered social welfare program, railroad retirement benefits are
not alterable by contract.
The Fourth Circuit explained that the Memorandum merely was a
political compromise and an agreement to make joint legislative recommendations. The Memorandum, according to the Vollmar court, represented
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the willingness of labor management to shift the tax burden for benefits
from the employee to the employer. The court pointed out that at no time,
however, was the Memorandum free from statutory regulation. In 1981,
Congress enacted certain Railroad Retirement Amendments that again shifted
a greater portion of the tax burden to the employees, notwithstanding the
Memorandum. The parties to the Memorandum supported the enactment
of these amendments and continued making the statutorily required contributions. The Fourth Circuit in the Vollmar case stressed that even when
Congress incorporates the terms of a bargaining agreement, such as the
Memorandum in question, in its legislation, the agreement does not become
a contract. The agreement remains a statutory entitlement, subject to change
by Congress at any time.
The Vollmar court further explained that the purpose behind the Foreign
Service Exclusion was to protect the interests of American railroad employees
who work outside the United States. When another country statutorily
requires a hiring preference in favor of its own citizens, American workers
lose their "equal footing" with these foreign nationals. According to the
Fourth Circuit, acceptance of the plaintiffs' position in this case would
result in this inequality.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' claim for recovery
in quasi-contract. The plaintiffs argued that CSXT would receive an unjust
enrichment if the court allowed CSXT to retain the refund of the retirement
taxes it previously contributed for the plaintiffs' services. Additionally, the
plaintiffs argued that the court should not allow CSXT to receive tax
benefits resulting from the application of the Foreign Service Exclusion.
The plaintiffs' argument contended that they conferred a benefit upon
CSXT by forfeiting a greater than four percent wage increase. The plaintiffs
agreed to this forfeiture with the understanding that CSXT would contribute
to the plaintiffs' retirement benefits.
Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument, the Fourth Circuit found that the
Memorandum between the parties only incorporated the parties' agreement
to support legislation regarding retirement benefits. Because the plaintiffs'
right to retirement benefits was at all times statutory, and because the
Memorandum did not change the plaintiffs' rights, the plaintiffs were
justified in expecting CSXT to contribute to their benefits only as long as
the statutes so required. The Fourth Circuit explained that the plaintiffs'
arguments would allow private parties to avoid congressional action. Therefore, the court refused to accept the plaintiffs' position.
The Vollmar court concluded that the Memorandum upon which the
plaintiffs relied for their contractual claim created no contractual right to
the retirement benefits that the defendant contributed. The court stated that
railroad retirement benefits are statutory only and cannot be altered by
contract. Further, the Fourth Circuit found that the Foreign Service Exclusion precluded any statutory relief for the plaintiffs. To date, the Fourth
Circuit is the only circuit that has addressed the issue of the Foreign Service
Exclusion in relation to a collective bargaining agreement allegedly granting
contractual entitlement to retirement benefits. However, the United States
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Supreme Court has held that railroad retirement benefits are statutory and
not contractual, 5 7 which supports the conclusion of the Vollmar court.
In Meyers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth
Circuit held that an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should evaluate the
impact of pain on Social Security disability claimants even if the claimant
only can prove the intensity of the pain by subjective evidence.' The
Secretary of the Social Security Administration (Secretary), however, issued
a ruling requiring claimants to present objective proof of the intensity of
their pain before the agency would grant an award of social security
disability benefits.5 9 In PPG Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 823
n.9 (4th Cir 1982), the Fourth Circuit held that the court would not defer
to an agency's legal analysis when that analysis conflicted with the decisional
law of the circuit, thus rejecting rulings similar to the Secretary's objective
evidence requirement. 6 0
This conflict between the Secretary's ruling and Fourth Circuit case law
sparked a class action suit in which the parties have appeared before the
Fourth Circuit three times. In the most recent of those appearances, Hyatt
v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the district court correctly determined that the Secretary's new pain
directives were not a change from the agency's earlier, discredited position;
whether the court properly expanded the class of claimants to include those
persons whose claims were rejected up until the date of the agency's
implementation of the new regulation; and whether the court usurped the
agency's power by drafting a new regulation and mandating its application.
The complicated history of the present case began when claimants
brought a class action suit against the Secretary alleging that the Secretary's
ruling on pain cases, SSR 82-58, did not follow the precedent of the Fourth
Circuit in adjudicating cases within the Fourth Circuit. The district court
held for the plaintiffs and enjoined the Secretary from nonacquiescence of
Fourth Circuit law. During pendency of the Secretary's appeal, section two
of the newly-enacted Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act (DIBRA), 42 U.S.C. section 423 (1982), set out standards that included both
mental and physical impairments for consideration. Because of the enactment of DIBRA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's finding of
nonacquiescence so that the Secretary could review the policy. The Fourth
157. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (holding that

railroad retirement benefits are statutory in nature); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979) (same).
158. See Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming Fourth Circuit's
disallowance of requirements of objective pain evidence); Foster v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1125

(4th Cir. 1986) (same).
159. See Social Security Administration Ruling 82-58 (1982) (requiring objective evidence
of intensity of claimant's pain).
160. See Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

975 (1980) (requiring agencies to follow decisional law of circuit); Allegheny General Hospital
v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1979) (same).
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Circuit also held that the district court's certification of the class was too
broad because it included claimants who had yet to exhaust their administrative remedies. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Fourth Circuit's decision under Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467
(1986), which held that exhaustion of a claimant's remedies is unnecessary
in extreme situations. On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court correctly waived the exhaustion requirement. Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court correctly had determined that the Secretary
had failed to acquiesce in Fourth Circuit law. The Fourth Circuit, however,
refused to affirm the district court's grant of injunctive relief, reasoning
that such relief was beyond the scope of the remand order. The court noted
only that the plaintiffs had succeeded in getting their claims considered
apart from the Secretary's nonacquiescence.
The Secretary subsequently issued a new ruling, SSR 88-13, and a series
of new directives to adjudicators detailing the new policy regarding the
evidence required to prove debilitating pain. On remand, the district court
determined that the Secretary's new pain directives did not represent any
real change from the old policy and, therefore, the district court ordered
the Secretary to reconsider the claims under Fourth Circuit law. After the
Secretary refused to comply, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the judgment.
The district court determined that the Secretary had continued to disregard
Fourth Circuit law because the Secretary required claimants to present
objective evidence of their level of pain. The district court not only ordered
the Secretary to rescind the new directives, but also drafted a new regulation
regarding pain, and ordered the Secretary to distribute the new regulation
to the agency's decision makers in North Carolina. The court also extended
the closing date of the class to the date whenever the Secretary complied
and issued the new regulation drafted by the court. The Secretary appealed
the court's orders, arguing that the prior regulation on pain correctly
reflected the law and that the district court should not have extended the
class because the Secretary's new directives were correct under the Fourth
Circuit law. The Secretary also contended that the district court was ultra
vires when drafting a new regulation and mandating its application.
On the issue whether the Secretary's old ruling, SSR 82-58, was a correct
statement of the law, the Fourth Circuit first disregarded the Secretary's
argument that DIBRA codified SSR 82-58 and, therefore, that SSR 82-58
superseded the case law of the Fourth Circuit. The court noted that DIBRA
did not codify SSR 82-58 because, while DIBRA requires objective evidence
of an underlying condition that may be causing claimant's pain, SSR 82-58
exceeds DIBRA's requirements and mandates that claimants provide additional objective evidence on the intensity and persistence of the pain. Because
SSR 82-58 was contrary to the case law of the Fourth Circuit, the court,
therefore, rejected SSR 82-58.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed whether the district court correctly
found that the Secretary's new pain directives were contrary to the decisional
law of the circuit. The Fourth Circuit first examined the stated purpose of
the new directives. Concluding that the stated purpose was to retain the
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Secretary's old policy on pain, the Fourth Circuit found that the Secretary
had not departed from its nonacquiescence of Fourth Circuit law. The court
then examined the wording of the new directives, noting that large sections
of the text were identical to the text of the rejected SSR 82-58. Because
these sections of text required objective evidence of the intensity of the
claimant's pain, and that the Secretary refused explicitly to state the circuit's
rule on pain to the ALJs while expressly adhering to SSR 82-58's rule on
pain, the court determined that the Secretary's nonacquiescence had not
changed. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that the district court properly
determined that the Secretary's directives showed no acquiescence to Fourth
Circuit law.
Addressing the Secretary's contention that the district court incorrectly
expanded the class to include claimants rejected up until the date when the
Secretary complied with the district court order, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the Secretary had not discontinued its "systematic, unpublished policy
that denied benefits in disregard of the law". The Fourth Circuit, relying
on Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986), held that the district
court properly extended the class. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's order of March 31, 1989 regarding extension of the class,
but modified the cutoff date for reconsideration of claims to whenever the
Secretary complies with the court's current opinion.
When reviewing further clauses of the district court order, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the rescission of two of the Secretary's newer pain directives, but remanded a third for determination of whether it was in violation
of Fourth Circuit law. The Fourth Circuit then upheld a fourth pain ruling,
SSR 88-13, on the condition that the Secretary amend the ruling by clearly
expressing that it is not a mere rehashing of the old policy. The district
court's order also had required the Secretary to keep plaintiffs' counsel
updated concerning any and all new pain regulations promulgated by the
agency. The Fourth Circuit vacated this provision of the court order on
separation of powers grounds, stating that the provision encroached too far
into the realm of the executive branch. Finally, when considering whether
the district court improperly drafted a new regulation that the Secretary
must implement, the Fourth Circuit noted that agencies should first be given
an opportunity to draft a proper regulation and that courts should draft
regulations only in extreme cases. The Fourth Circuit determined that the
case at hand was not an extreme case and, therefore, amended the district
court order.
At the time of the enactment of DIBRA, every Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals, except the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, followed the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the Secretary's original
position on pain embodied in SSR 82-58.161 Moreover, the court's rejection

161. See H.R. REP. No. 98-618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
& ADMiN. NEWS 3062 (noting that every circuit except D.C. Circuit has held that Social
Security Administration must consider subjective evidence of pain).
CONG.
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of the objective evidence requirement in the Secretary's newer directives has
been followed by every circuit in the country. 1 2
In Tice v. Botetourt County School Board, 908 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir.
1990), the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Matthew L. Tice
(Matthew), an emotionally disturbed first grader, was entitled, under the
Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (the Act), 20 U.S.C.
sections 1400-1485, to reimbursement by the Botetourt County School Board
(the School Board) of educational expenses. Matthew's parents (the Tices)
represented him in this action.
The Act provides federal funds to assist state and local education
authorities in the education of handicapped children. This funding is conditioned on a state's compliance with extensive procedural requirements and
on the existence of a state policy that assures all handicapped children the
right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). A FAPE is provided
to a child through an individualized education program (IEP), specially
designed for the child through school board consultation with the child's
parents or guardians. This special instruction is designed to meet the unique
needs of handicapped children at no cost to the parent. Special education
under the Act includes instruction the child receives in hospitals and institutions.
The Act strictly defines procedures that a school board must follow
when developing a FAPE. These procedures include a series of deadlines
which the school board must meet to assure that the handicapped child's
due process rights have not been violated. In Tice the Botetourt County
School Board failed to meet most of the deadlines required under the Act.
The School Board's most egregious error was its significant delay in the
formal assessment of Matthew's needs. According to Virginia state regulations, an eligibility committee appointed by the School Board should have
completed the evaluation process within sixty-five working days of the initial
referral. 63 However, the eligibility committee did not meet to evaluate
Matthew's placement needs until over 200 days after the referral. Although
the Tices brought the referral during Matthew's first grade year, the eligi162. See Prince v. Bowen, 894 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that adjudicator must
recognize pain even when claimant presents no objective evidence of pain's intensity); Copeland
v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that adjudicator cannot disallow pain testimony
merely because claimant presents no objective evidence of pain intensity); Listenbee v. Secretary
of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding subjective evidence of
pain intensity admissible if accompanied by objective evidence of underlying condition);
Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); Woody v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 859 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693 (7th Cir
1987) (same); Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987) (same); Brown v. Bowen, 794
F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding ALJ properly weighed evidence of pain when ALJ considered
pain despite lack of objective evidence); Parfait v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1986) (same);
DaRosa v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1986) (same);
Freeman v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
163. Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Handicapped Children and
Youth in Virginia § II(A)(6)(e) (1984).
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bility committee did not conduct the evaluation until well into what should
have been Matthew's second grade year. When the eligibility committee
finally met, the committee determined that Matthew was not handicapped
and, therefore, was ineligible for special education services. However, the
committee did recommend that Matthew receive counseling at his parents'
expense.
Matthew's parents took Matthew to a child psychiatrist, who examined
him and recommended immediate placement in special education services.
The school board received a copy of the psychiatrist's report on December
1, 1986. On December 4, 1986, Matthew became hysterical at school. On
the advice of his doctor, Matthew's parents admitted him to Roanoke Valley
Psychiatric Center. Matthew was suffering from what the psychiatrist termed
to be a nervous breakdown. While in the hospital, Matthew received medical
attention for his physical and emotional needs. Additionally, Matthew
received daily educational services at the Blue Ridge Center, the hospital's
certified school program.
The eligibility committee reconvened and rescinded its previous decision
concerning Matthew. The committee found Matthew to be eligible for special
services as a handicapped child belonging to both the emotionally disturbed
and learning disabled categories. However, the committee decided to wait
to determine Matthew's specific IEP needs until Matthew was released from
the hospital. On January 6, 1987, Matthew's mother met with Botetourt
County officials to discuss Matthew's IEP for the rest of the 1986-87 school
year. The School Board, after consultation with Matthew's mother, designed
an IEP that did not provide for individualized psychological counseling.
The Tices did not request a program providing for psychological counseling.
Mrs. Tice agreed to and signed the IEP. Matthew and his parents continued
to seek counseling through June 1987 at the Tices' expense. Matthew's
condition improved greatly, and he successfully completed first grade.
In July 1987, the Tices demanded that the school board fully reimburse
them for expenses incurred during Matthew's hospitalization as well as for
counseling after Matthew received his IEP. They claimed that because of
the undue delay in Matthew's evaluation, he was denied the FAPE to which
he was entitled under the Act. They argued that this denial necessitated
Matthew's hospitalization and subsequent need for psychiatric help which,
they argued, were services necessarily related to Matthew's education. The
School Board rejected the Tice's claim. The Tices then requested and were
granted a formal hearing pursuant to Virginia state regulations.'6
The hearing officer found in favor of Botetourt County. Although the
hearing officer found that the School Board had violated the evaluation
time limits established by state regulation, the hearing officer held that the
Tices could not recover expenses. The hearing officer found the Tices
ineligible, for expense recovery because the Tices had failed to prove that
the School Board's delay caused or significantly contributed to Matthew's

164. Id at § II(C)(1)(b)(1).
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hospitalization. The hearing officer further held that the counseling services
rendered to Matthew, during and after Matthew's hospitalization, were
purely medical and not educational. Therefore, the hearing officer found
that Matthew's counseling expenses were not compensable under the Act.
The hearing officer also held that the Act did not cover Matthew's schooling
at the Blue Ridge Center because Matthew's medical and emotional needs
necessitated this schooling.
The Tices appealed the decision to a state review officer, who used
similar reasoning to affirm the hearing officer's decision. Pursuant to 20
U.S.C. section 1415(e), the Tices then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia, challenging the review officer's
decision. The district court upheld the state review officer's ruling in all
respects. The Fourth Circuit addressed Tices' arguments in Tice v. Botetourt
County School Board, 908 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1990).
In Tice the Fourth Circuit found that the hearing officer, the review
officer and the district court had incorrectly inquired into whether the
School Board's delay caused Matthew's hospitalization when they determined whether the Tices were eligible for reimbursement. The Fourth Circuit
cited School Commission of Town of Burlington v. MassachusettsDepartment of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985), for the principle that reimbursement
of special education expenses under the Act is appropriate if two factors
are present. First, the decision-maker must find that the public school
system was not providing the child with a FAPE. Second, the decisionmaker must find that the parents' alternative placement was proper under
the Act. 165
The Fourth Circuit used a twofold inquiry to determine whether Matthew was receiving a FAPE. First, the court inquired into whether the state
had complied with the procedures set forth in the Act. Second, the court
considered whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits. The Fourth Circuit addressed these issues
with regard to each of the Tices' claims.
First, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Matthew was
receiving a FAPE during his hospitalization, before the School Board
implemented Matthew's IEP. Because Matthew was handicapped as defined
by the Act and because Botetourt County failed to complete Matthew's
evaluation on time, the court found that Matthew was not receiving a
FAPE during this time.
Second, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Matthew was
receiving a FAPE after the IEP was implemented, even though the IEP did
not provide for psychotherapy. To prove that Matthew did not receive a
FAPE after the IEP, the Tices were required to prove that Matthew's IEP,
absent psychiatric counseling, was not reasonably calculated to enable him
to receive educational benefits. Finding that the Tices failed in their burden

165. School Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S.
359, 369-70 (1985).

